Page 140 - Solving Housing Disputes
P. 140

26. The HDS proposal also appears to assume that housing law is static and all
                 that will be required of the HDS officer will be to apply clearly-established
                 principles to facts.  This is incorrect. The law is constantly developing and
                 novel points arise frequently.  For example, it was only through advocacy and
                 judicial determinations that vital safeguards such as the ability of occupiers
                 to rely on Article 8 ECHR were established.  Our view is that a lawyer-free
                 zone, with occasional appeals, will lead to the atrophy of this area of law.

             27. Article 6 ECHR: the HDS would in our view be a breach of Article 6 ECHR.
                 The HDS could not itself satisfy the requirements of Article 6 for “a fair and
                 public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
                 tribunal established by law”, with judgment pronounced publicly, and it is
                 appears that the report (properly) accepts this.  The argument is made (to the
                 extent that it is made at all - the discussion is limited to a single footnote) that
                 Article 6 is not breached because participants in the HDS retain “unfettered
                 access to the courts should they not agree with the outcome” (footnote 46).

             28. The starting point in respect of ADR and Article 6 remains Halsey v Milton
                 Keynes General NHS trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, in which the Court stated
                 that (at para 9):

                 We heard argument on the question whether the court has power to order
                 parties to submit their disputes to mediation against their will. It is one thing
                 to encourage the parties to agree to mediation, even to encourage them in the
                 strongest terms. It is another to order them to do so. It seems to us that to
                 oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to
                 impose an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court…it
                 seems  to  us  likely  that compulsion of  ADR  would  be  regarded  as  an
                 unacceptable constraint on the right of access to the court and, therefore, a
                 violation of article 6.

             29. In support of the HDS, reliance is placed on the case of Lomax v Lomax [2019]
                 EWCA Civ 1467.  In this case, the Court held that there was a power to order
                 an Early Neutral Evaluation to take place even if not all the parties consented
                 to it.  However, Moylan LJ noted that Halsey:
                 ...was dealing with a very different situation. It was concerned with whether
                 a court can oblige parties “to submit their disputes to mediation”. It does not,



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