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encroach on, the role of [independent] legal representatives”. 296 However, the
commitment expressed in the proposal that “we should never again see families
struggling, as we did in the many years that followed Hillsborough, against the
very system that was supposed to deliver answers – and, ultimately, justice” is
to be welcomed. 297 The Working Party considers that the best way to achieve
this is to ensure that implementation of recommendations is routinely (and
transparently) monitored by an external body, so as to prevent the continual
recurrence of deaths in similar circumstances.
Parliamentary Oversight
6.27 Whilst we consider that the reform with the greatest impact would be the
establishment of an independent monitoring body, more could be done within
existing arrangements to monitor the implementation of recommendations.
6.28 Parliamentary Select Committees have been underused in holding Ministers to
account for their role in implementing inquiry recommendations. In How
public inquiries can lead to change, the Institute for Government noted that
only six of the 68 inquiries established since 1990 have received dedicated
follow-up by a select committee. The authors formulated a recommendation to
address this apparent lacuna in accountability:
The Liaison Committee should consider adding an eleventh core task to
the guidance that steers select committee work: scrutinising the
implementation of inquiry findings. This scrutiny should be based on a
comprehensive and timely government response to inquiry
recommendations after the publication of an inquiry report. Departments
should update the relevant select committee on implementation progress
on an annual basis for at least five years following an inquiry report. In
296 JUSTICE, ‘Ministry of Justice – Establishing an Independent Public Advocate consultation:
JUSTICE consultation response’, December 2018, para 5.
297 Ministry of Justice (2018), supra note 295, Foreword.
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