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suicide management and  inadequate healthcare”, in addition to “other
               contributory factors [including] lack of staff training, poor communication and
               poor record keeping”. 268  This is despite 15 PFD reports relating to the deaths
               having been issued over the same period.

         6.7   The reasons why institutions fail to change – behavioural, cultural, political as
                                                                                  269
               well as legal – are complex, and stretch beyond the scope of this review.
               However, the Working Party felt that it was critical to consider how the justice
               system might be reformed to promote meaningful implementation following
               the inquiry process. We appreciate that this is of central importance to those
               principally affected by catastrophic events, who  see recommendations
               formulated at the conclusion of the legal process, then hear about deaths in
               similar circumstances months or years later.

         Inquiry design


         Limited tenure of judicial chairs

         6.8   Where judicial chairs are appointed, there  is an  inherent  limitation  in  their
               ability to initiate a process of systemic change:

                   By nature of their training and experience, judges tend to see the end of
                   an inquiry as a hard point of separation, after which their involvement
                   ceases…their oaths preclude them from getting involved in  politics...
                   However, such a wall between an inquiry and its aftermath entails the loss
                   of the chair’s unique standing and moral authority, which often make
                   them one of the most effective advocates for their recommendations. 270



         268  INQUEST, ‘Still Dying on the Inside’, May 2018, p. 16.
         269   See Bennett Institute  for Public Policy,  ‘Workshop Report: Policy Lessons from Catastrophic
         Events’, May 2020, Introduction. Various root causes include a “focus on regulatory requirements rather
         than doing what is right for people”; a lack of diversity (including cognitive diversity) in decision-
         making roles; a failure to take opportunities to learn from “near-misses”; a reliance on simple fixes and
         resistance to acknowledging complexity; in addition to organisational systems, processes and cultures.
         270  Norris and Shepheard, supra note 21, p. 17.
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