Page 96 - When Things Go Wrong

6.9 Evidence to the Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005 underscores the
point. Beatson LJ suggested that “unless an inquiry directly concerns the
administration of justice, or where there has been prior agreement about this...a
judge should not be asked to comment on the recommendations in his report
or to take part in its implementation”. 271 Lord Gill added that “once the inquiry
chairman has reported, that is the end of it as far as the chairman goes. His job
is done, and I would not wish to be involved in any follow-up. The
implementation of recommendations is an entirely different exercise. That is
for the politicians and the Executive to do”. 272

6.10 One way this inherent limitation can be counteracted is to incorporate time-
limits for implementation within the drafting of recommendations. Each of the
detailed recommendations arising from the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry was
given a time limit paired with an institution responsible for its
implementation. 273 This pragmatic approach, however, is atypical.

Scrutiny by inquiries

6.11 Despite the limitations outlined above, inquiries can themselves play a part in
monitoring implementation of recommendations. The Independent Inquiry
into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) has incorporated monitoring into its
processes:

How the Inquiry monitors institutional responses to recommendations

The Inquiry expects that where recommendations are addressed to an
institution, the institution will act upon those recommendations and publish the
steps they will take in response, along with a timetable for doing so. The
Inquiry suggests that, unless otherwise stated, institutions should do this within
six months of the recommendation being published. The Inquiry monitors the
responses of institutions through the following formal process:

271 Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005, supra note 30, para 268.
272 Ibid, para 277.

273 The Rt Hon Lord Cullen PC, The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry: Part 1 Report (2000), p. 225.
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