Page 59 - Reforming Benefits Decision-Making -(updated - August 2021)
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application of the good reason test. In our view, a warning is more likely to
               increase subsequent compliance. Studies have shown that sanctions can be
               counterproductive in terms of future  compliance   and a warning would
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               provide an opportunity to ensure that claimants understand their commitments
               and are not being sanctioned due to a lack of understanding. Further, we think
               this is fair given the serious consequences of non-compliance. We understand
               that the DWP was  trialling this in  a series of small-scale proof of  concept
               pilots for failure to attend a Work-Search Review, but these were put on hold
               due  to  the pandemic.  We hope that these are picked back  up  as  soon as
               possible and, if successful, applied more widely to any sanctionable failure.


          2.73  The Work  and  Pensions  Select  Committee  also  recommended  that  once  a
               sanctions decision  is referred to  the decision-maker  there should be an
               additional  stage where the decision-maker would make  a “provisional
               decision.” This would be  communicated to the claimant,  together with  the
               evidence on which it was based. The claimant would then have 30 days to
               challenge this evidence or actively opt not to provide further evidence.
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          2.74  This system is not dissimilar  from  a trial  ‘early warning system’  that was
               tested by the DWP  in 2016. Under  this trial if,  at  the end of  the normal
               decision-making process, the decision-maker would have normally sanctioned
               a claimant, instead a Sanctions Warning Letter would be sent to the claimant
               giving them 14 days  to  provide  extra evidence.  The decision-maker would
               decide whether to apply the sanction at the end of those 14 days, taking any
               additional evidence provided into account. Only 13 per cent of claimants took
               advantage of the extra time to provide evidence and in half the cases in which
               the evidence was provided the sanction was  imposed. The evaluation  also
               found that  the  trial did not impact on the quality of evidence provided by
               claimants. 160  Based on the findings of this trial the DWP stated that it would




          158  Welfare Conditionality, Final findings report: Welfare Conditionality Project (see n. 121 above) p.
          4.
          159  Work and Pensions Committee, Benefits Sanctions (see n. 11 above) para 125.
          160  Government Social Research and the DWP, Jobseeker’s Allowance: Sanctions Early Warning Trial
          (2018).


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